Reliability of safety-critical systems is a paramount issue in system engineering because in most practical situations the reliability of a non series-parallel network system has to be calculated. Some methods for calculating reliability use the probability principle of inclusionexclusion. When dealing with complex networks, this leads to very long mathematical expressions which are usually computationally very expensive to calculate. In this paper, we provide a new expression to simplify the probability principle of inclusion-exclusion formula for intersections of unions, which appear when calculating reliability on non series-parallel network systems. This new expression exploits the presence of many repeated events and has many fewer terms, which significantly reduces the computational cost. We also show that the general form of the probability principle of inclusion-exclusion formula has a double exponential complexity whereas the simplified form has only an exponential complexity with a linear exponent. Finally, we illustrate how to use this result when calculating the reliability of a door management system in aircraft engineering.
Introduction
Reliability of a network system is the probability of the system not failing. It is a critical issue in different fields such as computer networks, information networks or gas networks. In particular, reliability of safety-critical network systems [11] is an important topic in system engineering. For example, in aircraft architecture with safety-critical network systems such as fly-by-wire, actuation, fire warning and door management systems. In most practical situations, the reliability of a complex network system (e.g. a system that is not series-parallel) has to be exactly calculated [6] . There are several methods to calculate or simulate the reliability of a complex system which have been developed in recent decades. Some classical static modelling techniques, including reliability block diagram models ( [8] ), fault tree models, and binary decision diagram models, have been widely used to model static systems. A general introduction to these methods can be found in [11] . For time-dependent systems, modeling techniques such as Markov models [9] , dynamic fault tree models [2] and Petri net models [19] have been used. In this paper, we propose a new method to calculate the reliability for static systems with a new way of writing the classical probability principle of inclusion-exclusion formula. The classical probability principle of inclusion-exclusion formula is 
The new method detects which combination of events lead to the same event when simplified and has therefore many fewer summands than the classical formula for intersections of unions.
Practical reliability calculations often involve very long expressions when the probability principle of inclusion-exclusion formula (1) is used. Therefore, there are many approaches in in the literature on general network reliability calculations to simplify the probability principle of inclusion-exclusion as, for example, partitioning techniques [5] and sum of disjoint products ( [1] , [10] , [12] , [18] ). This latter technique is the most often used approach with recent results in [17] , [16] , [15] or [13] . In this paper we propose a new approach to simplify the probability principle of inclusion-exclusion and to apply it to the calculation of the reliability of complex network systems in system engineering. In system engineering, most network systems have multiple functions that have to be performed and they are not always independent (e.g., they share components). Furthermore, most functions in a system have to be redundant. A function is redundant if two disjoint sets of components of the system can perform that function. Reliability can also be increased if different sets of components in the network can perform the same function. Therefore, these functions are implemented multiple times in the network system through different sets of components and the calculation of the reliability of the network system becomes a very complex task.
In our paper, we assume that all failure probabilities of the components are known exactly. We do not consider the case when these probabilities are known only approximately (e.g., either by estimation or a confidence interval). If the different components of the network are independent of each other, then we can easily calculate the reliability of a set of components. Through this we can calculate the reliability of one implementation of a function, which is defined as the probability of the event that one implementation of the function does not fail. Finally, the probability of an intersection of such events can be calculated easily. But if full independence cannot be assumed, then the calculation becomes very expensive, usually prohibitive.
When dealing with optimization problems with reliability constraints, which is the motivation of our research, this calculation cost causes that even models for very small networks are completely intractable.
The reason is the large number of variables and non-linear constraints involved in the reliability calculation within the optimization model. Furthermore the approaches to simplify the probability principle of inclusion-exclusion formula mentioned before (e.g., sum of disjoint products) are not suitable to be used within an optimization formulation. Also, approximation, lower or upper bounds for the principal of inclusion-exclusion are not suitable for exact optimization because they are not in general monotone increasing or decreasing with the reliability. We provide an example for the lower bound in Appendix A. Therefore, in practice, optimization models that involve reliability are usually either solved through heuristics or series-parallel systems are assumed ( [3] , [7] , [14] ).
In this paper, we show how to calculate the reliability of a whole network system in which components are not necessarily independent in a way that requires considerably fewer calculations (and, thus, it is much cheaper computationally) than the direct use of the probability inclusion-exclusion principle. The key is to exploit the fact that, when dealing with a network system, the probability inclusion-exclusion principle has many repeated terms when applied to intersections of unions. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we show why it can be expensive to calculate the reliability of a non series-parallel system. We also state the main result (Proposition 1) which provides a formula to calculate the reliability for a network system in an exact way with a much lower number of calculations. In Section 3 we first state an auxiliary result needed to prove Proposition 1 and then we prove the mentioned proposition. Time complexity is analysed in Section 4. Section 5 shows an example to illustrate how to calculate reliability using the results of this paper. Finally, some conclusions and future perspectives are discussed in Section 6.
Motivation and main result
We start by showing that, if independence cannot be assumed, then it can be very expensive to calculate the probability of a non series-parallel network system with multiple functions and implementations. Afterwards, we introduce a result (Proposition 1) that reduces the number of calculations involved. Let F i , i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, be the event that function i of a system does not fail in a specific period of time and F ij , j ∈ {1, . . . , t i }, be the event that implementation j of function i does not fail in a specific period of time. Let F = {F 1 , . . . , F n } be the set of all functions and F i = {F i1 , . . . , F iti } be the set of all implementations of function i. Furthermore, let R be the event that the system does not fail. The reliability of the system, P (R), is the probability that no function in F fails. A function F ∈ F does not fail if at least one of its implementations does not fail. Therefore,
Because the different functions and implementations may not be independent, P (R) is not easily calculable. In order to work on this expression, first we need to establish some notation. Let W = {1, . . . , t 1 } × . . . × {1, . . . , t n }, and
We then have that
Now the probability principle of inclusion-exclusion can be used and it follows that
The number of summands in (2), which is equal to the number of possible intersections of B w 's, is Table 1 : Number of summands in the probability principle of inclusion-exclusion formula.
As can be seen, even for a small number of functions and implementations, the calculation of P (R) becomes very expensive. However, note that there are many (a priori different) terms that, when the intersection of the sets is calculated, lead to the same intersection set, that is,
For example, let F = {F 1 , F 2 }, F 1 = {F 11 , F 12 } and F 2 = {F 21 , F 22 }. It follows that
It can be seen, for example, that
Therefore, it seems natural to determine which combinations lead to the same intersection set and then simplify the formula. The result we are looking for, which will be proved later in the paper, is the following:
. . , F n } and let F i = {F i1 , . . . , F iti }, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, be sets of events such that
t i and, given k ∈ {n, n + 1, . . . , m}, let
Set C k is the family of sets E = {E 1 , . . . , E k } with cardinality k of events of implementations not failing where every function i, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, is implemented at least once. It holds that Table 2 shows the total number of summands that we obtain when we use the result stated in Proposition 1 for different numbers of functions and implementations. We assume that every function has the same number of implementations. In this case, the number of summands can be calculated by summing over k ∈ {n, . . . , m} the cardinalities of |C k |. It holds that
which is proven in Lemma 3. Therefore, the expression given by (4) has a exponential computational complexity with a linear exponent. Tables 1 and 2 , we can see an enormous reduction in the number of terms involved to calculate the same value of P (R).
|F|

Proof of Proposition 1
In this section, we prove Proposition 1 after stating and proving an auxiliary result (Lemma 2). As we mentioned earlier (see (3)), there are different subsets of W in formula (2) that lead to the same intersection set and, therefore, the same probability. The first result of the following lemma enables us to count how many different subsets of W with the same cardinality t ∈ {1, . . . , |W |} lead to the same intersection set. The second result of Lemma 2 gives us the coefficient of an intersection set E in formula (4).
Lemma 2.
Let t, n ∈ N + and let A 1 , . . . , A n be non-empty sets with
Furthermore, let us define s(e) = {e 1 , . . . , e n } for e = (e 1 , . . . , e n ) ∈ D and, given
Let c(A, t) be the total number of non-empty subsets {e 1 , . . . , e t } ⊆ D of cardinality t such that
2.
Proof.
1.) First we prove (6) by induction over k ≥ n. We use i j = 0 if j > i several times throughout the proof. The first time it is needed is to see that for all t with t > |D|, we have that c(A, t) = 0 because there exist no subsets of D with cardinality strictly greater than |D|. Furthermore, if t > |D| and because p(I, A) ≤ |D|, the right side of (6) is 0. Therefore, (6) holds for t > |D|. In the following, we assume that t ≤ |D|. If k = n, then |A 1 | = . . . = |A n | = 1 and |D| = 1 and we can assume t = 1. Thus
Moreover, |D| = 1 means that there exists exactly one vector e ∈ D and s(e) = A. Therefore, c(A, 1) = 1 and the formula is correct for k = n. Let us assume that (6) holds for n, k, t ∈ N + with k ≥ n. We will show that it also holds for k + 1. For this, let A 1 , . . . , A n be non-empty sets with 
Since for these sets A\J we have that |A\J| ≤ k, we can use the induction hypothesis to obtain that the number of such sets, for each J, is c(A\J, t), where we define A\J = (A 1 \J, . . . , A n \J). Therefore, using that |D| = p(A, A) we have that
We can drop the condition p(A\J, A) = 0, because if p(A\J, A) = 0 then there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that A i \J = ∅ and therefore we have for all I ⊆ A\J that p(I, A\J) = 0. Thus, by dropping the condition only zeros are added to the sum. Furthermore based on the definition of function p, we know that for all I, J ⊆ A :
Next, we define A[ ] = {I ⊆ A : |I| = }, ∈ N + , and we have that
The last step is known from the general result for unordered sampling without replacement in combinatorics. (9) can now be used to rewrite (8) by summing over sets L = I\J with the coefficients |A|− j instead of summing over J and I separately. We can write now that
Let nowˆ ∈ {1, . . . ,
and that L appears exactly once for all possible combinations j + =ˆ with the coefficients (−1)ˆ (10) . Therefore, we can take the sum over the sets L ∈ A[k + 1 −ˆ ] forˆ ∈ {1, . . . , k + 1 − n} and it holds that
Finally, by using the following known result from combinatorics
we have that
This completes the proof for (6).
2.) Now we will prove the second result, (7), for n ≥ 1 and k ≥ 1 with n ≤ k by induction over m = k − n. Let n ≥ 1, k ≥ 1 and let A 1 , . . . , A n be non-empty sets with
We can rewrite (7) by using (6) as follows:
Next we use (12) again and it holds that
If we now modify the external sum on the previous expression to start with i = n, it follows that
If m = 0 and therefore n = k, then
Therefore, equation (7) holds for m = 0. We assume now that it holds for n ≥ 1 and k ≥ 1 with m = k − n and m ≥ 0. Without loss of generality, we show that it also holds for m + 1 with m + 1 = (k + 1) − n by fixing n. For this, let A 1 , . . . , A n be non-empty sets with A i ∩ A j = ∅ for all i = j, and A = A i . Also, letÂ 1 , . . . ,Â n−1 be non-empty sets withÂ 1 = A 2 , . . . ,Â n−1 = A n andÂ = n−1 i=1Â i . By using (14) , it holds that
The sum over the subsets I can be split by considering whether the subsets contain δ or not:
Using that A * \{δ} = A and that no subset of A can be of cardinality k + 1, we can rewrite the first sum:
where we use (14) to obtain this last inequality. Finally, by using the induction hypothesis for m = k − n:
To proof that (7) holds for m + 1, we only have to show that
First, we rewrite the left-hand side of (15) as follows:
The following observations are needed to rewrite (16) further.
1. First note that that A * \A * 1 =Â, and that for all I ⊆Â :
2. In addition A * \{δ} = A and for all I ⊆ A it holds that
and therefore
Moreover, it holds that
Now we can rewrite (16) by splitting the sum over subsets I by considering whether or not the subset is disjoint with A 1 .
(−1)
By using (17), we can rewrite the sum over I ⊆ A * \A * 1 =Â and using (18) the sum over I ⊆ A * \{δ} = A. Furthermore, we can change the upper limit of the first sum in (19) to |Â| = k − |A 1 |. Therefore, we can write that (19) is
And because (k − |A 1 |) − (n − 1) < m + 1 and k − n < m + 1, we can use the induction hypothesis on both sums and we use (14) to obtain that
Hence, we have proven that
holds for any n ≥ 1 and k ≥ 1 with k − n ≥ 0.
We can now prove our main result Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 1.
Since R = F ∈F F , it follows that
F iwi and
We can rewrite (21) as
Using the probability principle of inclusion-exclusion (1), it holds that
Based on the definition of B w , w ∈ W , we know that ∀I ⊆ W ∃k ∈ {n, n + 1, . . . , m} and ∃E = {E 1 , . . . , E k } ∈ C k :
We define for all k ∈ {n, n + 1, . . . , m} and E ∈ C k :
Furthermore for all k ∈ {n, . . . , m}, lE ∈ C k and ∈ {1, . . . , |D E |} let us define
T (E, ) = I ⊆ W : |I| = and i∈I B i = E and
If we use (23), we can rewrite (22) to a sum over E ∈ C k , k = n, . . . , m, where the coefficients are
. Furthermore, we can rewrite the coefficient to
In addition, let E = (F 1 ∩ E, . . . , F n ∩ E). Based on the first result (6) from Lemma 2, we know that t(E, ) = c (E, ) for all k ∈ {n, n + 1, . . . , m}, E ∈ C k and ∈ {1, . . . , |D E |}. This gives us that (23) is
and using (7) from Lemma 2, it holds that
This completes the proof and we have shown that (4) holds.
Time complexity of main result
In this section, we will proof the time complexity of the new formula in Proposition 1 through Lemma 3.
. . , n}, be sets of cardinality t i , t i ≥ 1 and F = (F i , . . . , F n ). Define m := n i=1 t i and, given k ∈ {n, n + 1, . . . , m},
Proof. We proof (25) by induction. Let n ≥ 1 and t i ≥ 1, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We use induction on = m − n. Because all t i , i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, are greater than 1, m ≥ n and can first assume = 0 with m = n. With m = n, we have that t 1 = . . . = t n = 1. Therefore C n = {{F 11 , . . . , F n1 }} and
|Fi| − 1 = n i=1 1 = 1 and (25) holds for = 0. We assume now that (25) holds for n ≥ 1 and t i ≥ 1, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, with = m − n and ≥ 0. Without loss of generality, we show it also holds for + 1 with + 1 = (m + 1) − n by fixing n. Let n ≥ 1, F i = {F i1 , . . . , F iti }, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, be sets of cardinality t i , t i ≥ 1 and m = n i=1 t i . We then know that c(F) = n i=1 2 |Fi| − 1 . Without loss of generality, let
. . , n − 1} and F = (F 1 , . . . ,F n−1 ). For k ∈ {n, . . . , m + 1}, we can split the set C F * k by considering whether or not δ is contained in E we have that
For k ∈ {n, . . . , m}, {E ∈ C
The set {E ∈ C F * k : δ ∈ E}, k ∈ {n, . . . , m + 1}, can be further split into two sets by considering if for
Therefore it holds that
δ ∈ E and F n ∩ E = ∅} = ∅ for k ∈ {m + 2, . . . , m + 1}. Becausem + 1 − (n − 1) < (m + 1) − n = + 1, we can use the induction hypothesis and it holds that
Now we consider the sets {E ∈ C
and we have that |E ∩ F * i | = 1 for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Therefore, {E ∈ C F * n : δ ∈ E and F n ∩ E = ∅} = ∅. For k ∈ {n + 1, . . . , m + 1} it holds that
and it follows that
By using the induction hypothesis again,
We can now write
and using (26), (27) and (28), we obtain that it is
This shows that (25) holds for + 1 and it completes the proof.
Example
In aircraft architecture there are many different types of safety-critical systems such as networked aircraft systems, fire warning systems or stall recovery systems. In this example we consider the door management system (DMS) of an aircraft which falls into the category of networked aircraft systems. DMS is a safetycritical system which checks the status of doors, regulates the locks and relays information to on-board computers and pressurization regulators. See Figure 1 for an example of a DMS at one door. As a safety-critical system which can not be repaired during use, it must meet some reliability threshold. As the DMS is responsible for all the doors to the outside in the aircraft and also gives the possibility that different components (switches, actuators, etc.) can be used by different doors, it is a complex network system for which the calculation of reliability is computationally very expensive as shown in Section 2. However, the computational effort of the calculation of the reliability of the DMS is reduced considerably by using Proposition 1. The functionality of the DMS for each door can be seen as a function of the systems. Hence, let the aircraft have n doors and we then have the event set F = {F 1 , . . . , F n } where F i is the event "The functionality of the DMS for door i in the system does not fail". Furthermore, let an implementation of the functionality of a door be a set of components and the corresponding connections that can check the status of door, regulate the locks and relay information to on-board computers and pressurization regulators while no subset of these components and connections can be removed without losing functionality. Because the DMS is a safety-critical system that has to be redundant, there are at least two implementations for every door. Let F i = {F i1 , . . . , F iti } and t i ≥ 2 , i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, be event sets where F ij is the event "The implementation j of door i does not fail". Lastly, let R be the event "The DMS system for all doors does not fail". With these event sets, we can calculate the reliability P (R) of the DMS with the formula
from Proposition 1. Furthermore the calculation of P (
. . , m} is simple. Let T c be the event that component c of the DMS system does not fail. Since we are considering a static system, we know the probability of P (T c ) = a c with a c ∈ (0, 1). Let T Fij be the set of components of implementation j for door i. Since we assume that all components have independent failures for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and for all j ∈ {1, . . . , t i }, then
Therefore, for all k ∈ {n, n + 1, . . . , m} and for all E ∈ C k , it holds that
If z is the number of components of the system, we know that each summand of (29) is a product of at most z factors. In Table 3 , we show the time in seconds needed to calculate the reliability of DMS systems with different numbers of doors and implementations per door by using Proposition 1 (TNew) and by using the classic probability principle of inclusion-exclusion (2) (TOld). In the header row of Table 3 As can be seen, there is a huge reduction on the computational time if we use the expression (29) that we have introduced in this paper. This difference increases when the number of doors and implementations does. Furthermore, it can be observed that the number of components and connections does not affect the computation time not significantly.
Conclusions
In this paper we have introduced a new expression (Proposition 1) which reduces considerably the computational effort needed for the calculation of the probability principle of inclusion-exclusion when applied to intersections of unions of events. It has been shown that the formula obtained can be applied to the reliability calculation of complex network systems and it allows to decrease the computational time significantly. Furthermore, it has also been shown that the computational complexity is reduced from double exponential to exponential with linear exponent. This result opens doors to formulate optimization problems of complex network systems that include the exact reliability of the system without depending solely on heuristics to solve it. A potential extension for future research is to generalize Proposition 1 and Lemma 2. For example, the implementation for a function i can be also used for function j with i = j which results in F i ∩F j = ∅. This can result in a simplification of the probability principle of inclusion-exclusion with summand coefficients that are not −1 or 1 but still give a decrease on the number of summands compared to Proposition 1.
A Lower bound of probability principle of inclusion-exclusion
When you want to optimize the reliability of a system, you cannot use lower bounds. To use a lower bound, we need that the lower bound of the reliability of T 1 is lower than the lower bound of the reliability of T 2 if the reliability of a system T 1 is lower than the reliability of a system T 2 . Otherwise, one cannot be sure that the optimal solution you get by using the lower bound is the optimal solution regarding the exact reliability. We did not find a lower bound that is suitable for optimization and fulfills that latter criterion.
We show an example of two systems where the reliability of one system is greater than the other, but the lower bound of the reliability of the former is smaller than the latter. This is the reason why it is not suitable to use in optimization. For the example, we use the following lower bound proposed by [4] . Let A 1 , . . . , A n be the considered events, S 1 = n k=1 P (A k ) and S 2 = 1≤i<j≤n P (A i ∩ A j ).
Theorem 4. [4]
Given a probability measure space (Ω, F, P ), let A k ∈ F, k = 1, . . . , n. Because it is not easy to define θ in an optimization constraint, we consider the minimum of the right-hand side which occurs with θ = 0 and we obtain that
Calculating the derivatives, it is easy to see that θ = 0 gives the minimum of the right-hand side, if the lower bound given by the right-hand side is considered as function f of θ. It is easily seen that f is a concave function for 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 and f (0) = f (1) . This gives you that f (0) ≤ f (θ) for 0 ≤ θ < 1. For the example, let us assume that we have a system with one function and the function is implemented three times. Let A, B and C be the implementations. We can calculate for system T the exact reliability P (T ) as follows :
P (T ) = P (A ∪ B ∪ C) = P (A) + P (B) + P (C) − P (A ∩ B) − P (A ∩ C) − P (B ∩ C) + P (A ∩ B ∩ C).
We will also calculate a lower bound based on (31). Let T 1 and T 2 be as seen in Figures 3 and 4 , respectively. Furthermore, let P (1) = 0.5, P (2) = 0.7, P (3) = 0.2, P (4) = 0.6 and P (5) = 0.3 be the probabilities of the unit not failing for T 1 and take P (3) = 0.2521 for T 2 . We obtain that P (T 1 ) = 0.2668 and that P (T 2 ) = 0.2668232. Therefore, the reliability of T 2 is greater than the reliability of T 1 . But if we look at the lower bounds, we have that P (T 1 ) lb = 0.2260049 and P (T 2 ) lb = 0.2257831. Therefore, we can see that the lower bound of T 1 is greater than the lower bound of T 2 . This shows us that the lower bounds are not monotone increasing with the reliability and therefore should be used for exact optimization of reliability systems. Another example is system T 3 in Figure 5 . Let 1, 2, 4 and 5 have the same probabilities of not failing as for T 1 and let P (3) = 0.3. We obtain that P (T 3 ) = 0.261 for T 3 which is smaller than P (T 1 ) and P (T 2 ). But the lower bound of P (T 3 ) is P (T 3 ) lb = 0.2278481 which is greater than the lower bound of P (T 1 ) and P (T 2 ). 
